Abstract-A thorough understanding of the safety risks of a system requires an understanding of its human and organizational factors, as well as its technical components. Analysis approaches that focus only on the latter without considering, for example, how human decision makers may respond to a technical failure, are not able to adequately capture the wide variety of safety risk scenarios that need to be considered. In this paper, we propose a model-based analysis approach that allows analysts to interpret humans and organizations in terms of components and their behavior in terms of failure logic. Our approach builds on top of CHESS-FLA, which is a tool-supported failure logic analysis technique that supports analysis of component-based system architectures to understand what can go wrong at the system level and to identify the causes (i.e. faulty components). However, CHESS-FLA currently deals only with hardware and software components and thus it is not adequate to reason about socio-technical systems. We therefore provide an extension based on a preexisting classification of socio-failures and combine it with the one used in CHESS-FLA for technical failures, thereby giving birth to a novel approach to analysis of socio-technical systems. We demonstrate our approach on an example from the petroleum domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying the things that may go wrong and the ways in which this may happen is an essential part of risk analysis [1] . Several techniques are at disposal for addressing this [2] . These techniques offer different advantages (e.g. presence of toolsupport, focus on linear relationships, focus on both linear and non-linear relationships, focus on technological factors, focus on human factors, etc.), which rarely are combined into a unified technique. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to risk identification aimed at socio-technical systems, with specialized support for classification of human and organizational as well as technical failures.
The approach builds on CHESS-FLA [3] , which is a plugin within the CHESS toolset allowing users to decorate component-based architectural models with safety related information (i.e. specification of failure behaviour), execute Failure Logic Analysis (FLA) techniques, and get the analysis results back-propagated onto the original model. CHESS-FLA allows architects and safety engineer to jointly analyse linear relationship-based failure propagation and thus intervene when necessary. Currently, CHESS-FLA only targets architectures composed of hardware and software components.
In the framework of the CONCERTO project [4] , we are interested in reasoning about socio-technical systems, where human and organizational factors play an important role. To do that, CHESS-FLA needs to be extended. Besides the two technological (hardware and software components) entities handled by CHESS-FLA, additional entities need to be considered. More precisely, we propose a method called CONCERTO-FLA that permits architects to interpret human and organizations in terms of components and their behavior in terms of failure logic. CONCERTO-FLA includes, as in a concert, more voices: not only technological components but also human and organizational components.
Our proposal builds on top of a pre-existing classification of typical organizational and human failures and combines it with the typical and entity independent failure classification provided in and used in CHESS-FLA.
The contribution of this paper is a novel approach to modelbased safety risk identification that
• is specifically aimed at socio-technical systems,
• supports capture of human, organizational and technical components in a common model, thus facilitating unified analysis of complex socio-technical systems,
• builds on existing classifications of human, organizational and technical failures, thereby exploiting existing domain knowledge, and
• facilitates automated analysis of complex failure propagations and transformations, with back-propagation of analysis results to the component model in order to ease understanding of the results.
To show the usage and effectiveness of our method, we then demonstrate it to a simple socio-technical system. More specifically, we introduce essential information to be able to architect parts of an offshore petroleum installation and consider humans, organizations, and technological entities.
Then, based on a hypothetic scenario we perform our analysis and we give our lessons learned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide essential background information. In Section III we present our method for performing failure logic analysis on socio-technical systems. In Section IV, we demonstrate our method. In Section V, we discuss our achievements. In Section VI we discuss related work. Finally, in Section VII we present some concluding remarks and future work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we recall some background information onto which our worked is based. More specifically, we briefly recall essential characteristics of socio-technical systems, CHESS-FLA and MTO-oriented risk assessment methods.
A. Socio-technical Systems
Socio (of people and society) and technical (of machines and technology) is combined to give socio-technical. Sociotechnical refers to the interrelatedness of 'social' and 'technical' [5] . Successful (or unsuccessful) system performance depends on this interrelatedness, which comprises linear 'cause and effect' relationships, and 'non-linear', complex, even unpredictable relationships.
B. CHESS-FLA
CHESS-FLA [3] is a plugin within the CHESS toolset (developed in the framework of the CHESS project [6] ) allowing users to decorate component-based architectural models (specified using the CHESS modeling language, called CHESS-ML) with safety related information, execute Failure Logic Analysis (FLA) techniques (precisely FPTC [7] and FI 4 FA [8] ), and get the analysis results back-propagated onto the original model. FLA can be used at the early stages of the design phase to achieve a robust architecture with respect to linear relationships. CHESS-FLA targets architectures constituted of hardware and software components. In this paper we limit the attention to FPTC. FPTC (Failure Propagation Transformation Calculus) is a compositional technique to qualitatively assess the dependability/safety of component-based systems. FPTC allows users to calculate the behaviour at system-level, based on the specification of the behaviour related to individual components.
A component can behave as a source (e.g. meaning that a component generates a failure in output due to activation of internal faults) or as a sink (a component is capable of avoiding failure propagation by detecting and correcting the failure in input). Moreover the failures that arrive in a component can propagate (passing on a failure from input to output) and can also be transformed (changing the nature of the failure from one type to another from input to output).
The behaviour of the individual components, established by studying the components in isolation, is expressed by a set of logical expressions (FPTC rules) that relate output failures (occurring on output ports) to combinations of input failures (occurring on input ports). The syntax supported in CHESS-FLA to specify the component's behavior is: The above rule should be read as follows: if the component C1 receives on its port R1 a normal behaviour, it generates on its output port P1 a coarse (i.e. clearly detectable) value failure (a failure that manifests itself with a value failure mode).
From a semantics point of view, the inter-connected components are considered as a token (failure/no-failure)-passing network. To determine the behaviour at system level, it is necessary to consider the set of all possible behaviours (failure and or normal behaviour) that can be propagated along a connection (called tokenset). More specifically, the behavior at system level is obtained through a fixed-point calculation that calculates the maximal tokenset on any connection in the network. Further explanation on FPTC semantics can be found in [7] .
FPTC combines and automatize traditional risk identification techniques (i.e., Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis). Since these techniques are often suggested within safety standards, FPTC represents and interesting means to be considered for the provision of safety certification artefacts.
C. MTO-oriented Risk Assessment Methods
The MTO (Man, Technology and Organization) concept, which originated in Sweden, is similar to the Human Factors (HF) concept developed in the USA [9] . It was the intent that the explicit mention of the three interrelated elements in the concept would stimulate a comprehensive "system view" on safety. Man, Technology and Organization are interrelated and should all be considered in safety assessment. Various MTOoriented results for supporting risk assessment methods exist. As reviewed in [2] , Rasmussen's Socio-Technical Framework is a system-oriented approach that allows modelling the organizational, management and operational structures that create the preconditions for accidents. In Rasmussen's hierarchical model, accidents are caused by decisions and actions made by decision makers at all levels, not only on process control layer. A vertical information cycle in the hierarchy creates the relation between each entity, Organization, Human and Technology.
MTO-oriented failure classifications are used to better classify what can go wrong. HFACS and SERA, for instance, are two MTO-oriented classifications. HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System) [10] is based on Reason's concept of latent and active failures and embraces all aspects of human failures, including the conditions of operators and organizational failures. According to Reason, an individual fails (produces an active failure/unsafe act) as a consequence of latent failures (seen as preconditions for unsafe acts) that originate from organizational factors. Thus, the investigation of latent failures is crucial to avoid the unfair criminalization of individuals [11] . HFACS describes four levels of failures: 1) Unsafe Acts, 2) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, 3) Unsafe Supervision, and 4) Organizational Influences.
SERA (Systematic Error and Risk Anal
HFACS and provides a set of active failure produce. As HFACS, SERA considers four SERA specializes the level of Unsafe Ac SERA, a human can produce 12 categories (unsafe acts). These failures may be caused which include: the state of the humans, t conditions, command, control, superv organizational influences. In this section, w category (namely, attention failure) and precondition (namely, time pressure) that w III-IV. Attention failure means that the requi available, but a human fails to attend relevan to, for example, insufficient time to attend aspect of the task (selective attention) is also attention failure. One precondition that may failure is the time pressure from the o pressure is related to the tempo of the task there is no or little time to think and react.
III. TOWARDS CONCERTO-FL
In this section, we introduce CONCERTO novel method for the analysis of failure technical systems. First, we provide CONCERTO-FLA, then we explain its s entities. Finally, we explain how socio-b interpreted in terms of FPTC. As the name highlights, CONCERTOharmonizing the co-existence of human entities and technological components. technical ''voices'' work in concertation, the including human and organizational entities, architected and then analysed with respect wrong in the case of misbehaving componen Fig.1 shows a high-level view of the ov propose to enable architects and safety man the failure behaviour at socio-technical syste the failure behaviour specified via FPTC ru and connector level.
A. CONCERTO-FLA Overview

B. Support for Socio-entities and Correspon
To enable the modeling of socio-entitie consider two additional types of compon organizational, which in turn can be fu according to the SERA preconditions. Thu language (called CONCERTO-ML) should lysis) [12] 
Similarly to what we observed we inspected thoroughly the failures, we realized that these as a composite component repr factors and specializations of t be modeled as interconnecte composite). In our extended arc composite components shou composite components using organizational influences on composite components are (composite) components.
C. Interpretation of Socio-beha
The previous subsection prop CHESS-ML towards CONCER architects to model socio-tech facilitate analysis, we need elements (components and c information concerning the nom to FPTC syntactical rules. To [3] that are at disposal for deco should be available also fo composite components and r language constructs should als connectors since, as stated in [2 do not simply occur due to in rather they occur when externa interactions among system co handled. Moreover, at the insta not only to inherit the FPTC r needed since the risk identifica specific installation and not at t e able to distinguish the different architectural concertation. More zational components should be ponents. The motivation for this A classification. By inspecting ories of human failures (e.g. that these failures are related to nalities: internal functionalities rceiving, deciding, etc. and acting. Thus, we propose to mposite components comprising ctionalities (e.g. sensor-like) and omic components). As a simple elve SERA categories of human an internal component, named .g., attention is the name of an gly to the category attention ed on SERA, these components onent, that we call Action. Input component should be connected of the logical (or sensor-like) f the action-related component e output port of the human omponents can be connected to , and only one action-related ed for one human component. for the human categories, when e preconditions of the human preconditions could be modeled resenting globally organizational these factors (preconditions) can ed subcomponents (atomic or chitectural model, organizational uld be connected to human appropriate ports to capture n human behavior. Human then connected to technical aviour in Terms of FPTC posed a possible evolution of RTO-ML. This evolution enables hnical architectures. In order to to decorate the architectural connectors) with safety-related minal/failure behavior according do that the language constructs orating SW and HW components or human and organizational related sub-components. These so be at disposal for decorating 2], accidents in complex systems ndependent component failures; al disturbances or dysfunctional omponents are not adequately ance level, it should be possible rules, but also to refine them, if ation should be analysed for the type level in a generic way [13] .
By thoroughly inspecting the human preconditions, we realized that the twelve ca failures and corresponding preconditions id do not specify in which way these failures/pr manifest themselves. We therefore propose t human/organizational failures in terms of t proposed in [14] and then extended in [15] .
As result, an incidence matrix can be dr the possible combinations of failure modes w propagation flow from organizational su human-related subcomponents. The filled-in could represent generic as well as domain propagation flows of failure-modes and thus designer in modeling a system. Table 1 sh example of such an incidence matrix, where valid propagation flows from organizational failures. From Table 1 , bottom-left gray cel that if an internal organizational componen pressure produces a valueCoarse, that failure the human attention-related internal compone 
IV. APPLYING CONCERTO-FL
In this section, we apply CONCERTO-FL domain-related socio-technical system. Thus, description of our system, then we follow th in Fig.1 i.e. we model in CONCERTO-ML decorate it with safety information and fin perform FPTC analysis.
A. Petroleum Domain-related System
Offshore petroleum installations (called socio-technical systems that involve several health, safety, and the environment [16] . In present (as done in [17] ) a simplified subsy used to illustrate our modelling and analys subsystem concerns work permits and is p barrier function to prevent safety incidents s hydrocarbons.
Workers that need to do non-routine including hot work such as welding, have to permit (WP) by filling out a standardized for to avoid potential conflicts between tasks th increased risk, to ensure that potentially r initiated unless all safety barriers are in go ensure that safety precautions are followed. decision makers go through all incoming WP decide which ones to release (i.e. accept) o slot for this meeting is fixed and the numb can be high, meaning that the decision make little time for each decision.
failures and their ategories of human dentified by SERA reconditions could to characterize the the failure modes rawn to synthesize with respect to the ub-components to n incidence matrix n-specific possible s can guide system hows a simplified e gray cells denote failures to human ll, we can retrieve nt related to time can be stopped by ent.
FPTC-terms zation essure eSubtle noFailure LA LA on a petroleum , first we provide a e process depicted L our system, we nally we manually rigs) are complex l major hazards to n this section, we ystem that will be sis approach. This part of an overall such as ignition of work on the rig, o apply for a work rm. The purpose is hat may represent risky work is not ood shape, and to Every 12th hour, P applications and or reject. The time ber of applications ers may have very A database stores informat to safety on the rig. This incl about errors that have been d yet fixed, components that maintenance, and so on. responsible for ensuring that th up-to-date and correctly reflec Information from the database need it when they need it on the We now consider a hypo detectors in an area on the rig being long overdue for mainte WP for performing hot work, s work may lead to ignition if t not be allowed unless the gas good state. Hence, a decision considered a failure. In the analysis approach by consider contributing factors to such makers failing to check the cu and 2) the deviations databa actual state of the gas detection
B. Modeling
To model the socio-tech Section IV-A, we first identif and how they are interconnecte subsystem, called WP_Decisio CONCERTO-ML. Organization is only comp Time_Pressure. Decision_mak (since he/she relies on data organization, which establishes pace via Time_Pressure. As Fig.2 shows, WP_Decisio composite component with th tion about all deviations related ludes, for example, information etected on components but not t are overdue for periodic A database administrator is he information in the database is cts the current state of the rig. must be "pulled" by those who eir own initiative. othetic scenario where the gas g (area A) are unreliable due to enance. A worker applies for a such as welding, in area A. Hot there is gas present and should detectors are known to be in a n to release the WP would be following we demonstrate our ring two scenarios where major a failure are 1) the decision urrent state of the gas detection, se not correctly reflecting the n.
hnical subsystem described in fy the (composite) components ed. Fig.2 shows how this simple on_System, can be modelled in FLA architectural model f WP_Decision_System are: a ht gray) to represent the human technological component to med Deviations_DB); and a dark gray) to represent the Decision_maker is composed of n (sensory-like component) and ent). For sake of simplicity, posed of one subcomponent: ker is connected to the database coming from it) and to the s the Decision_maker's working on_System is represented as a hree input ports: WPA (which stands for Work Permit Application), ADMI the connection with database administrator) represents potential influence from regulati the organization). WP_Decision_System is m output port named WP, which denotes the work permit. After having studied the b component in isolation or after having perfor brainstorming analysis on its potential be FPTC rules can be provided to specify suc space reasons, in Fig.2 , each component is only two rules. The rules that characterize partially stem from the incidence matrix intr III-C. Since the time pressure on the hum attention failure, the attention component omission. Concerning Deviations_DB, we behaves as a propagator.
C. Analysis
In this section, we illustrate how the be level can be calculated based on the behav components. To do that, we consider two sce Scenario 1, represented in Fig. 2 , describ Decision_maker fails to check the current detection. To better follow the failure propa assumption that the system is fed by norm database administrator enters correct da regulation pressure on the organization and in the work permit application), Fig. 3 transformation rules, which are those rules The FPTC rule of the Time_Pressure comp and produces valueSubtle at the output po pressure originating from the organization. ADMIN port will be propagated through th component to the Decision_Maker comp from Deviations_DB and valueSubtle from T then forwarded to the Decision_Maker com Attention subcomponent. These two in c noFailure from WPA port will trigger first that produces an omission on the Attention rule represents the situation in which Decisio attend deviations from the database. The from the Attention component is forwarded t the Action component, and triggers the consequence of the omission, Decision_Mak decision by approving a work permit for ho where gas detectors may be unreliable. This represented by valueCoarse as output of A output of the system composite on the WP po Scenario 2 describes the case when the correctly reflecting the actual state of the gas scenario, the system has: noFailure on the W REG port, and valueCoarse at the ADMIN p 1, noFailure on the REG port propagates to v Organization output port. 
CUSSION
the lessons learned that we have ying CONCERTO-FLA to a system. The lessons concern the ects. Socio-technical concepts oint of view, CONCERTO-FLA managers to model all socio t be of interest to perform a within socio-technical systems decisions if needed. By using model humans as well as fety managers have at disposal a in terms of functional units that ity of the spectrum of sociobining SERA and CHESS-FLA, owerful means for analyzing the echnical behavior. Socio and ysed in a fine-grained way by e modes and thus specificoduced if needed. Scalabilityew, CONCERTO-FLA is rather tectures, for instance, can be and conquer" strategy (i.e., by the entire system). Similarly dels can be divided in various after piece. Analyzability of , organizational and technical ures-CONCERTO-FLA allows sed. Moreover, by allowing for onnectors, it also enables the ctions.
VI. RELATED WORK
In the past three decades, several research works on risk assessment techniques have been proposed. Early approaches were targeting single components in isolation, while, together with the growth of the system complexity, more recent approaches have targeted the complete system behavior.
In [18] , authors propose a new technique called SystemTheoretic Process Analysis that allows losses arising from component (technical, or socio) interactions to be captured. The system is seen as a set of control and feedback loops which interact with each other. Within CONCERTO-FLA, systems are not modeled in the same way. However, our proposal allows linear component interactions to be captured.
In [19] , authors criticize the feasibility of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) by pointing out that human and technological functions cannot be decomposed in the same manner. To limit uncertainty, authors state that a small number of subcomponents should be used to interpret a human as a composite. Our decomposition is currently coarse-grained. The trade-off in terms of granularity will depend on the stage of application of CONCERTO-FLA i.e. speculative vs. empirically grounded FPTC rules.
In [20] authors propose some perspectives and a possible research agenda to achieve a Safety Management System (SMS)-oriented approach combined with human factors to understand and control the overall system safety. Our approach is not SMS-oriented in itself, however it is supposed to be deployed within an SMS.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have introduced a novel model-based approach to perform failure logic analysis on socio-technical systems. Our approach, which is built on top of CHESS-FLA and SERA, supports architects and safety engineers in manually analyzing the failure propagation within systems constituted of not only hardware and software components but also organizational and human components.
In the future, we aim to validate the approach through application on more complex systems/scenarios. A major challenge will be to develop a comprehensive SERA-based failure types matrix and to provide detailed guidelines to support architect and safety managers in modeling (preanalysis) as well as in taking appropriate design decisions (post-analysis), based on the analysis results. We also aim at implementing our approach within the in progress CONCERTO toolset to offer automatic failure propagation analysis.
